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I. INTRODUCTION
The popular media often stigmatize corporations that utilize tax
loopholes not readily available to individual citizens.1 Specifically, the term is
known as corporate inversions, by which United States corporations are
acquired by foreign corporations in order to avoid the United States corporate


David Khanjyan is a third year law student at Pepperdine University School of Law. During
his law school career, he has had the opportunity to gain valuable work experience in tax planning
and controversy. He plans to pursue his LL.M. in taxation after completing law school and begin a
career in tax planning thereafter.
1
See John D. McKinnon & Damian Paletta, Obama Administration Issues New Rules to
Combat Tax Inversions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
treasury-to-unveil-measures-to-combat-tax-inversions-1411421056.
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tax,2 which is among the highest in the world.3 Corporate inversions have
become widely popular since 2008 as more corporations move abroad to save
taxes.4 As a consequence, media outlets, everyday citizens, and politicians
condemn corporations for abandoning their obligations to the United States
while individuals are liable for their respective shares.5 President Obama has
described the practice as “gaming the system,”6 painting inversions as
unpatriotic.7 Given the current sociopolitical landscape, in which educated
masses make daily decisions based on the political consequences of their
actions, corporations are sensitive to and, to some degree, influenced by the
pressure these masses put on them.8 While the social pressures may influence
some corporations to not undergo the “unpatriotic” tax avoidance route, it is
imperative that legislation be enacted to address not only the practice of
corporate inversions but also to attack the primary motivation for inversions—
the United States tax rate.9 On September 22, 2014, the Treasury Department
released Internal Revenue Service Notice 2014-52 (the Notice) as a preliminary
step to address the social backlash against corporate inversions.10 The Notice
was released in the midst of many pending acquisition deals, notably the Tim
Hortons acquisition of Burger King and the AstraZeneca acquisition of
Pfizer.11 While the Notice was largely effective in preventing corporate
inversions (many pending deals were cancelled with multi-million dollar
fees),12 they were not the reforms the United States needed at the time. Rather,


2

Id.
See Corporate Tax Rates 2015, DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates-2015.pdf (last updated Aug. 2015).
4
Steven Rattner, End Corporate Taxation, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2014, at A19, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/05/03/opinion/end-corporate-taxation.html?_r=0.
5
Ken Wells, Jonathan Allen, & Richard Rubin, How Inversions Leaped From the Shadows
and Doomed Antonio Weiss, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/politics/articles/2015-01-14/how-inversions-leaped-from-the-shadows-to-doom-treasurynominee.
6
Jeremy Bogaisky, Obama Administration Moves to Crack Down on Tax Inversions, FORBES
(Sept. 22, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2014/09/22/obama-admin
istration-moves-to-crack-down-on-tax-inversions/.
7
McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 1.
8
See Richard Trumka, Let’s Call ‘Corporate Inversions’ for What It Is: A Gaping,
Unpatriotic Tax Loophole, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 28, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/richard-trumka/lets-call-corporate-inver_b_5629936.html.
9
See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 440
(2013).
10
See infra Part V.
11
See infra Part V.
12
See Chipp Cummins, Salix, Cosmo Cancel Merger Agreement: Move Comes Amid
Crackdown on Inversion Deals, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/salix-cosmo-cancel3
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a better approach to corporate tax reform would be to develop a less prohibitive
system that incentivizes corporations to repatriate their profits, through either
changes to the tax rate and base provisions of the code13 or through the
adoption of a modified territorial system.14 With an alternative, simpler
approach that addresses the discrepancies between the United States laws and
those of foreign countries, the problem with collecting tax revenue from big
corporations and their tendency to conduct corporate inversions would be
remedied.
This paper will discuss the current structure of international tax, the need
for reform, and the Notice by the Treasury Department.15 Part II discusses the
general landscape of international tax and how the United States differentiates
domestic corporations and foreign corporations.16 It also compares the
different corporate tax rates of the developed countries, which lends itself to
the natural incentives U.S. corporations face to conduct inversions and avoid
taxes.17 Part III evaluates the Internal Revenue Code sections prior to the
Internal Revenue Service Notice 2014-52 of September 22, 2014.18 It explains
the loopholes corporations routinely utilize to avoid paying U.S. corporate tax
on foreign profits.19 Part IV introduces Notice 2014-52 and discusses how the
provisions therein address the faults of the pre-Notice law.20 Part V analyzes
the practical effects of the Notice thus far and the problems that arise as a result
of the provisions.21 Part VI presents some alternatives that better address the
corporate tax issues than the proposals in the Notice.22 The paper then
concludes that, while the purpose of the Notice to prevent corporate inversions
was met, the provisions in the Notice do not serve the best interest of the
United States or of multinational corporations, and in and of themselves, are
not sufficient to solve the corporate tax issues that plague big business.23
While there is difficulty in weighing the interests of U.S. corporations against
the interests of the United States, as well as in considering the pressures made


merger-agreement-1412319533 (last updated Oct. 3, 2014, 4:22 AM).
13
See infra Section VI.A.
14
See infra Section VI.B.
15
See infra Parts II, III, IV, V, VI and VII.
16
See infra Part II.
17
Id.
18
See infra Part III.
19
Id.
20
See infra Part IV.
21
See infra Part V.
22
See infra Part VI.
23
See infra Part VII.
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by individual people, the current law makes that conflict too polarized.24
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND TAX REFORM
To understand how corporate inversions work, one must first understand
the landscape of international tax. Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, U.S.
corporations are treated differently than foreign corporations.25 Particularly,
U.S. corporations that have over $10,000,000 in income are taxed at 35%.26
On the other hand, foreign corporations are only taxed this rate for income
derived in transactions “connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States” or “income . . . derived from sources within the
United States.”27 Relative to the tax rate of other developed countries, the tax
rate of the United States is among the highest.28 Therefore, notwithstanding
public opinion, it behooves corporations to qualify as foreign corporations
rather than domestic corporations because less of their profits would be subject
to U.S. rates.
In addition to the higher corporate tax rates, the United States does not
adopt a territorial system of tax.29 In other words, a U.S. multinational
corporation must pay taxes to the United States on profits generated abroad.30
Generally speaking, however, a domestic U.S. corporation receives tax credits
in the amount it paid in corporate taxes to foreign countries.31 Therefore, when
corporations operate internationally and have tax obligations to other countries,
their tax obligations to the United States are reduced by that much. For
example, if a corporation makes $10 million in income in Ireland and pays a
corporate tax to Ireland at a rate of 12.5%, then its obligations to the United
States would be reduced by that much when those profits are brought into the
United States and subject to U.S. corporate tax. The purpose of a corporate
inversion is to keep such foreign profits outside of the United States,


24

Id.
I.R.C. § 11(d) (2012).
26
Id. § 11(b)(1)(D).
27
Id. § 882 (West 2014).
28
See Corporate Tax Rates 2015, supra note 3. Canada and Germany, among many others,
have a tax rate of 15%. Id. Ireland, which is a very popular destination for corporate inversions,
has a tax rate of 12.5%. See McKinnon & Paletta, supra note 1; Corporate Tax Rates 2015, supra
note 3.
29
Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the
United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 163–67 (2012).
30
Id. at 163.
31
I.R.C. § 901 (2012).
25
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effectively not paying the 35% tax on all income derived abroad.32
The United States, however, did not always have such a relatively high
corporate tax rate compared to those of other countries.33 In his comment
discussing the various comparative arguments for corporate tax reform, Omri
Marian summarized the changes countries have made to their corporate tax
rates since the 1980s. He states:
In the early 1980s, the U.S. rate of fifty percent was only moderately higher
than the OECD average (excluding the United States) of about forty-seven
percent. The 1986 Tax Reform Act included a significant rate reduction,
bringing the combined state and federal corporate tax rate in the United States
to its approximate current level. This placed the U.S. statutory rate slightly
below the then-average OECD rate. However, while U.S. statutory rates have
remained pretty much constant since then, other countries have continued to
cut their statutory rates. Participants in the discourse frequently cite recent
examples that include Germany dramatically lowering its rates by ten
percentage points as part of a 2008 reform; the UK lowering its statutory rate
from 28% to 27% in 2011, with further gradual reductions planned over the
next three years to 24%; Canada lowering its statutory rate from 22% in 2007
to 18% last year, with a planned gradual reduction to an eventual 15% starting
in 2012; and China lowering its corporate tax rate from 33.3% to 25% in 2008.
Other countries cited as examples for corporate tax rate-reducing reforms
include, among others, Greece, Turkey, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Iceland,
Ireland, Mexico, Macedonia, Vietnam, and Taiwan.34

These changes support the arguments made by proponents who demand
U.S. corporate tax reform. While professionals in the field universally accept
the need for reform, Kimberly Clausing has described three challenges the
United States faces in addressing the corporate tax concerns.35 First, due to the
economic downturn that occurred around 2008 and the resulting budget deficits
coupled with increased healthcare and other public costs, policymakers are
sensitive to different reform proposals so as to generate sufficient revenue to
Additionally, policymakers must consider income
cover such costs.36
inequality, as the top 5% of households have seen significantly greater
increases in income, particularly with regards to capital gains.37 Lastly, with
evidence of globalization and an increase in foreign investments, the United
States should consider, to some degree, the separation of its tax system from


32

Wells et al., supra note 5.
See Marian, supra note 29, at 153–54.
34
Id.
35
See Clausing, supra note 9, at 420.
36
See id. at 420–21.
37
Id. at 421–22.
33
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those of other countries.38
Arguments to reform the tax code and address the corporate inversion
problem that plagues the United States are a fairly recent trend. Senator
Baucus, a Democrat from Montana, while serving as the chairman of the
Finance Committee, was among the first politicians to take steps against
corporate inversions in 2002.39 He, along with Republican Senator Charles
Grassley, issued a warning of potential legislation against corporations should
they continue to utilize the loopholes present in the tax code.40 In 2004, actual
legislation was enacted, formally codified in the Internal Revenue Code as
section 7874.41 Sophisticated tax professionals, however, managed to find a
loophole in section 7874 to be able to continue the practice of avoiding taxes
by moving a domestic corporation’s headquarters abroad.42 In 2013, with a
potential inversion underway by Applied Materials Inc., a U.S. semiconductor
corporation, Baucus urged Congress for further legislation.43 His proposals,
however, were denied due to lawmakers setting priorities and choosing to focus
more on the recession rather than tax concerns that had not fully developed.44
With the turn of the New Year came a surge of potential inversions, including
big names such as Pfizer, Chiquita Brands, and Burger King.45 Over the course
of the previous two years, more than a dozen inversions had been completed,
and it appeared that the number would continue to grow.46 This captured
President Obama’s attention, along with those of many tax professionals and
legislators.47 Different proposals were made, primarily focused around
completely restricting the practice of inversions or making the business
environment in the United States more suitable for businesses.48 While
Democrat Senator Carl Levin and Democrat Representative Sander Levin, both
from Michigan, argued that the Obama administration’s budget proposal
should be turned into highly restrictive legislation, Republicans and business
lobbyists argued to the contrary.49 In a floor speech on May 8, 2014,


38

Id. at 422–23.
Wells et al., supra note 5.
40
Id.
41
See id.; see also infra Section III.A.
42
Wells et al., supra note 5.
43
Id.
44
Id. Smaller companies, not yet household names, were pursuing inversions at the time in
small numbers, but there had not yet been concern for larger corporations. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
39
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Republican Senator Orrin Hatch from Utah argued that legislation must “make
the United States a more desirable location to headquarter one’s business.”50
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also expressed concern.51 Bruce Josten, a
lobbyist for the chambers stated: “We’ve got companies from one end of the
coast to the other who are very concerned about the need to fundamentally
make our tax code more competitive.”52 He described inversions as a negative
consequence of a failing tax code that is not in tune with its foreign
counterparts.53 With a wave of new potential inversions, the Treasury
Department became concerned.54 Tax revenue was in jeopardy. In an urgent
demand to Congress, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew stated: “Congress should
enact legislation immediately . . . to shut down this abuse of our tax system . . .
What we need as a nation is a new sense of economic patriotism, where we all
rise and fall together.”55 It was under these frantic circumstances, with a wave
of potential international mergers, that the Internal Revenue Service, under the
Treasury Department, provided the new proposed regulations that would make
inversions more difficult.56
III. THE LAW BEFORE THE IRS NOTICE
A. Inversion Transactions
Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code section 7874, an inversion
transaction is an acquisition in which a foreign acquiring corporation is treated
as a surrogate foreign corporation.57 In essence, it is when a foreign
corporation consumes a domestic corporation.58
A foreign acquiring
corporation is treated as a surrogate foreign corporation when it (1) acquires
substantially all of the property of the domestic corporation, (2) at least 60% of
the stock of a foreign acquiring corporation is held by former shareholders of
the domestic corporation, and (3) after the transaction, the expanded affiliated


50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
I.R.C. § 7874 (2012). This section of the code governs corporate inversions and addresses
corporations’ attempts to invert into foreign corporations in order to save on tax. Id. Instead of
merely treating a domestic corporation purchased by a foreign corporation as a foreign corporation,
section 7874 prescribes rules in order to prevent corporations from scheming their way out of their
U.S. tax obligations. See id.
58
See id.
51
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group (EAG) does not have much business in the country of the foreign
acquiring corporation relative to its business everywhere else.59 An EAG is
defined as a network of corporations of which 50% of its stock value and
voting power is owned directly by a parent corporation or indirectly by another
corporation, of which the parent corporation owns at least 50% of its stock
value and voting power.60 In other words, the EAG is a chain of corporations
that are controlled by the parent.61 Upon an inversion transaction’s completion,
the domestic corporation becomes known as an expatriated corporation,62
likely because of the negative stigma associated with the tax avoidance
purposes of inversions.
As previously mentioned, domestic corporations become involved in
inversion transactions in order to be categorized as foreign corporations, so as
to not pay the 35% United States corporate tax rate. The idea is that if a
foreign corporation buys a domestic corporation, the domestic corporation
would become a foreign corporation and would not subject its entire income to
U.S. taxes. The United States, aware of a corporation’s interest in minimizing


59

26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (2014). Generally speaking, a foreign acquiring corporation is
often considered a surrogate foreign corporation when the purpose of the inversion is to only avoid
taxes. The assumption is that the domestic corporation is totally consumed by the foreign
corporation. Additionally, in order to maintain control while avoiding taxes, the former
shareholders of the domestic corporations will retain as much stock in the foreign corporation as
possible. Therefore, the 60% stock ownership will readily be met. Note that the primary
ownership percentage that will be of issue is an 80% stock ownership calculation to treat foreign
corporations as domestic corporations. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. Lastly, in
reference to the third element, assuming the domestic corporation’s sales and operations continue
as before, much of the activity will continue to be conducted internationally, and would not
necessarily be focused in the country of the foreign acquiring corporation. The primary debate for
inversions, and the point of consideration of Notice 2014-52, is section 7874(b), which governs
when a foreign corporation will be treated as a domestic corporation for tax purposes. See infra
Section IV.A.
60
26 U.S.C. § 7874(c)(1) (2014).
61
See id.
62
Id. § 7874. The negative stigma of corporate inversions is frequently perpetuated by the
popular media. In one Huffington Post piece, author Richard Trumka claims:
The real problem is that many of these so-called “U.S.” corporations want to
keep dictating our economic policies and dominating our politics, yet they
have less and less loyalty to the people who actually live and work in
America. They want to keep benefiting from all the things our government
does for them . . . but they want the rest of us to front their share of the bill.
Trumka, supra note 8.
Furthermore, Robert Stack, deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury states: “Congress
should pass legislation immediately with an effective date of May 2014 to prevent companies from
effectively renouncing their citizenship.” Kevin Drawbaugh, Top Lawmaker Wants Corporate Tax
Loophole ‘Plugged Now’, REUTERS (July 22, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/07/22/us-congress-tax-inversions-idUSKBN0FR1RA20140722.
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costs, included a provision that a foreign corporation is treated as a domestic
corporation if it is a surrogate foreign corporation of which at least 80% of its
stock is owned by former shareholders of the domestic corporation.63 The
difference between the tax code and the new Department of Treasury Notice is
how share ownership is calculated.
While the Department of Treasury anticipated foreign corporate action
to reduce ownership by the domestic corporation to below 80%, the measures it
adopted to prevent such schemes were not sufficient. The primary measure
was to exclude disqualified stocks, issued in relation to the acquisition, in
calculating the ownership fraction.64 Disqualified stock is stock of the foreign
corporation acquired for non-qualified property, such as cash or its equivalent,
marketable securities, certain obligations, and property intended to avoid
section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code.65 The main concern for this
measure is that, in connection with the foreign acquisition of the domestic
corporation, the foreign corporation would issue more stock to dilute the
domestic corporation’s shares just below 80% to avoid being treated as a
domestic corporation.
B. Hopscotch Loans
After the inversion transaction, in which the domestic corporation is
acquired by the foreign corporation such that the domestic corporation owns
just less than 80% of the foreign corporation, the new corporation would
attempt to utilize the profits without repatriating income into the United States
to avoid the 35% tax rate. Should those profits be distributed within the United
States as dividends, they would be subject to the United States corporate tax.66
Corporations, however, utilize other loopholes, known as “hopscotch loans”
and like strategies, to deliver profits to other foreign subsidiaries disguised as
loans, or other property, rather than dividends, in order to officially avoid the


63

26 U.S.C. § 7874(b) (2014). The portion of Notice 2014-52 that tackles corporate
inversions focuses on this 80% calculation. See infra Section IV.A. As will be discussed in
specific detail, the Internal Revenue Service takes a new approach to calculating the domestic
corporation’s share of the foreign corporation’s stock. As could be inferred from a glance at the
Internal Revenue Code, a corporation that schemes to avoid taxes would benefit most if its
shareholders make up just less than 80% of the foreign corporation’s stock. This would maximize
the domestic corporation’s control of the foreign corporation while not being classified as a
domestic corporation.
64
26 U.S.C. § 7874(c)(2)(B) (2014).
65
Id.; 26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-4(T)(c)(1) (2014).
66
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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35% corporate tax.67 Section 956 of the Internal Revenue Code addresses these
dividends disguised as loans.68 Generally speaking, the loans or investments
would be given to the domestic corporation from a foreign corporation that the
domestic corporation controls. Section 957(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
deems foreign corporations, of which U.S. shareholders own 50% or more of
the value of stock or the combined voting power of all classes of stock, a
controlled foreign corporation (CFC).69 The code states that a U.S. shareholder
means, “with respect to any foreign corporation, a United States person . . .
who owns . . . or is considered as owning . . . 10 percent or more of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote of such a foreign
corporation.”70 Corporations are considered persons in the code.71 Given the
circumstances of corporate inversions, this ownership requirement is generally
met, and the U.S. domestic corporation that inverts abroad would be considered
a U.S. shareholder of that corporation.
According to the IRS Notice 2014-52, “[i]n the absence of section 956, a
U.S. shareholder of a CFC could access the CFCs funds . . . in a variety of
ways other than by the payment of an actual taxable dividend . . . .” 72 While
short-term investments or loans made by CFCs would not fall under the
purview of section 956, when long term transactions are made, such as a
foreign purchase of tangible property in the U.S., stock of the domestic
corporation, obligations to the U.S. shareholder, or various rights of use (i.e.
patents), some of the value given to the United States entity are taxable because
they are essentially dividends. Specifically, the lesser of
(1) the excess (if any) of – (A) [the U.S.] shareholder’s pro rata share of the
average of the amounts of United States property held (directly or indirectly)
by the controlled foreign corporation . . . over (B) the amount of earnings and
profits described in section 959(c)(1)(A) . . . or (2) such shareholder’s pro rata
share of the applicable earnings of such a controlled foreign corporation.73

Congressional intent was that such property should be “taxed . . . on the


67

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
26 U.S.C. § 956(a) (2012).
69
Id. § 957(a).
70
Id. § 951(b).
71
Id. § 7701(a)(1).
72
Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, Notice 2014-52, INTERNAL
REVENUE BULL. (Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 14, 2014,
at 712–23, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-42.pdf.
73
26 U.S.C. § 956(a) (2012).
68
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grounds that this is substantially the equivalent of a dividend.74 These
provisions, however, leave open the opportunity of a CFC to transfer loans to
or exchange cash for stock in a foreign acquiring corporation, which is not a
U.S. shareholder, and therefore would not fall under section 956. In other
words, while gains from long term CFC transfers to U.S. shareholders fall
under 956, transfers to other parties, not U.S. shareholders, do not fall under
section 956.75 The Internal Revenue Service Notice 2014-52 addresses this
loophole.
To summarize the common practice of corporate tax avoidance before
the recent regulations, it is best to think of the transactions in two steps,
consisting of three entities. The first step is the corporate inversion, during
which there is a transaction between two corporations, one domestic and one
foreign. The foreign acquiring corporation (FAC) acquires the domestic
corporation (DC), such that just less than 80% of the FAC’s stock remains in
the hands of the DC’s shareholders. This formally makes the DC a foreign
corporation, and sets the stage for various other strategies to use funds without
paying taxes. These strategies require the presence of another foreign
corporation (FC), of which the DC owns more than 50%, and would be
considered a CFC. Since the FAC is not considered a domestic entity, FC
could loan money to the FAC or transfer cash for stocks in FAC, skipping over
the DC altogether. The result is that those profits are transferred around the
world and used to continue operations but are not repatriated into the United
States to be taxed.
IV. IRS NOTICE 2014-52: NEW RULES REGARDING
INVERSIONS AND RELATED TRANSACTIONS
The IRS Notice 2014-52 (“Notice” or “Notice 2014-52”) attacks the
corporate scheme from two fronts. For one, it makes corporate inversions
more costly than before, making it difficult to qualify as a foreign corporation.
Secondly, even if a corporation qualifies as a foreign corporation, the tax
avoidance scheme is fruitless without being able to transfer profits without
paying U.S. income tax.
A. Regulations on Corporate Inversions
The first part of the Notice addresses corporate inversions. As described
above, the IRS treats foreign surrogate corporations as domestic corporations


74
75



S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 99 (1962).
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when a domestic corporation owns 80% or more of its stock.76 Notice 2014-52
prescribes a different method of calculating a domestic corporation’s
ownership fraction by not including some property owned by the expanded
affiliated group from the denominator, effectively inflating the domestic
corporation’s ownership. The Notice proposes a two-step process in reducing
the denominator value in the fraction of ownership. The first step is to
determine whether the denominator could be reduced. The second step
specifies how much the denominator would be reduced by.
The first part states that “if more than 50 percent of the gross value of all
‘foreign group property’ constitutes ‘foreign group nonqualified property,’ a
portion of the stock of the foreign acquiring corporation will be excluded from
the denominator of the ownership fraction.”77 This test would be applied after
the acquisition and related transactions.78 Foreign group property is “any
property . . . held by the EAG after the acquisition . . . [is] completed.”79
Property held directly or indirectly by the domestic entity at the time of the
acquisition that was acquired in the acquisition is not considered foreign group
property.80 In other words, property in the hands of the domestic entity is not
included.81 Foreign group nonqualified property is foreign group property that
includes:
(i) cash or cash equivalents, (ii) marketable securities, . . . (iii) an obligation
owed by . . . [a] member of the expanded affiliated group that includes the
foreign acquiring corporation; [a] former shareholder, . . . or former partner . . .
of the domestic entity; or [a] person that, before or after the acquisition, either
owns stock of, or a partnership interest in [the EAG or former partner or
shareholder of the domestic entity], [and] . . . (iv) [a]ny other property acquired
in a transaction . . . related to the acquisition with a principal purpose of
avoiding the purposes of section 7874 . . . .82

Foreign group nonqualified property that is transferred in exchange for
foreign group property that would be qualified is nevertheless treated as
nonqualified.83 Once it is determined that more than half of the foreign group
property is foreign group nonqualified property, the Notice prescribes how


76

See supra Section III.A.
See Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, Notice 2014-52, supra note 72,

77

at 712.
78

Id.
Id.
80
Id.
81
See id.
82
26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-4T(i)(7).
83
See Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, Notice 2014-52, supra note 72,
at 712.
79
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much of the EAG property will not be included in the denominator of the total
ownership fraction.84
The second part of the Notice to reduce the denominator is to determine
exactly how much property to not include in the denominator.85 The regulation
states after it is determined that more than half of the foreign group property is
considered foreign group nonqualified property, the amount that will be
excluded from the denominator of the fraction of ownership is the product of
(1) the value of stock of the foreign acquiring corporation, not including the
value of stock already excluded from the denominator because they are
disqualified stock, as expressed in regulation 1.7874-4T(b), and the value of
stock held by former shareholders of the domestic entity by reason of their
ownership of the domestic stock and (2) the foreign group nonqualified
property fraction.86 The foreign group nonqualified property fraction is the
fraction determined in the first step of the Notice mentioned above, but the
numerator and denominator are both reduced by the value giving rise to
unqualified stock, defined in regulation section 1.7874-4T(c).87
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Id.
Id.
86
Id.
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Id. The IRS presented a few hypotheticals to help gauge the exact process of calculating
the exclusion of certain assets from the denominator. Id. The Notice presented a situation in
which a foreign corporation, FA, has 20 shares of outstanding stock held by individual A. Id. FA
acquires all of the stock of a domestic corporation, DT, in exchange for 76 newly issued shares of
FA stock. Id. FA has become a foreign surrogate corporation as it acquired DT. Id. In a
transaction related to this acquisition, FA issues four shares of stock to individual A in exchange
for $50x cash. Id. As of this point, DT owns 76 shares of FT stock and individual A owns 24
shares of FT stock. Id. After these transfers, FT owns $50x cash (from individual A) and the DT
stock (from DT). Id. In addition to this, FT owns two other forms of assets: $150x of asset A
(which is foreign group nonqualified property) and $100x of asset B (which is not foreign group
nonqualified property). Id.
The facts in the previous paragraph present sufficient information to calculate the ownership
fraction and to determine whether FA will be treated as a domestic corporation pursuant to section
7874. Id. The first step is to determine whether there would be a reduction of the denominator
because at least half of the foreign group property is foreign group nonqualified property. Id.
Aside from the DT stock, which is not included in the calculation, FT has a total of $300x in assets
($100x of asset B, $150x of asset A, and $50x cash from individual A). Id. The $200x, in asset A
and cash from individual A, are nonqualified property. Id. Therefore, two-thirds (more than 50%)
of the foreign group property is made up of foreign group nonqualified property, which means
there will be some exclusion of assets of the ownership fraction denominator. Id.
The next step is to determine how much of the assets will be excluded from the denominator
of the ownership fraction. Id. The exact amount to exclude from the denominator is the product of
the outstanding value of stock in FA (minus some exceptions) and the foreign group nonqualified
property fraction. Id. FT has 100 outstanding shares. Id. The 76 shares owned by DT by reason
of and the four shares transferred to individual A for cash (which are disqualified shares) are not
included in the outstanding value of stock. Id. Therefore, the outstanding value of stock for the
purposes of the calculation is 20 shares. Id. The next step is to determine the foreign group
nonqualified property fraction. See id. This is determined as the fraction of foreign group
85



142

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. IX:I

In addition to proposing specific calculations to reduce the denominator
of the ownership fraction of the foreign acquiring corporation, the second part
of the Notice includes provisions for calculating the numerator. Section 2.02
of Notice 2014-52 described proposals affecting the numerator of the
ownership fraction, by disregarding certain transfers made by the domestic
entity to reduce its ownership to below 80%.88 This provision would attribute
greater ownership to the domestic corporation and effectively increase the
ownership percentage.
B. Post-Inversion Regulations for Hopscotch Loans
Section 3 of Notice 2014-52 proposes regulations affecting the postinversion transactions undergone by international corporations.89 The Notice
addresses the tax avoidance strategies that section 956 in its previous form did
not prevent. For one, hopscotch loans, property transferred from a CFC to the
foreign acquiring corporation, will be treated as U.S. property going to a U.S.
shareholder, although the foreign acquiring corporation is not a U.S.
shareholder.90 Similar treatment will be applied to transaction in which shares
of the foreign acquiring corporation are transferred to the CFC in exchange for
cash. In other words, when the foreign acquiring corporation receives cash as a
loan or for shares from a CFC, the proposed regulations would treat that cash
as U.S. property, as it would have had the cash fallen under section 956.91
V. THE EFFECTS OF NOTICE 2014-52
While Notice 2014-52, if adopted, would not be applied retroactively,


nonqualified property over the foreign group property, but both the numerator and denominator are
reduced by the value giving rise to unqualified stock. Id. In this case, $200x is foreign group
nonqualified property and $300x is the total foreign group property. Id. The value giving rise to
unqualified stock, which would be taken from both the numerator and denominator, is the $50x
cash that was received for the 4 shares of stock to individual A. Id. Therefore, the foreign group
nonqualified property fraction would be $150x/$250x. Id. The product of outstanding shares (20
shares) and the foreign group nonqualified property fraction ($150x/250x) is 12 shares. Id.
Therefore, the denominator of the ownership fraction is reduced by 12 shares. Id. The result is
that instead of DT owning 76 of the 96 shares (4 shares reduced as disqualified stock) of FT stock
(which is 79.2%), DT would be considered to own 76 of the 84 shares of FT stock (which is
90.5%). Id. Therefore, FT would be treated as a domestic corporation. See id. Had this regulation
not been in place, FT would not be considered a domestic corporation and the corporate inversion
scheme would have worked more easily. See id.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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many pending acquisition deals were put into question. The U.S. corporations
that were preparing to invert included Burger King Worldwide Inc., Pfizer Inc.,
Medtronic Inc., Chiquita Brands International Inc., and other pharmaceutical
and tech companies.92 While the regulations were anticipated, many experts
did not anticipate such far-reaching provisions.93
With new potential regulations essentially prohibiting hopscotch loans or
de-structuring strategies, many of the U.S. corporations with pending deals had
to reconsider their plans. AbbVie Inc., a U.S. pharmaceutical company,
cancelled its $54 billion merger with Irish pharmaceutical company Shire Plc.,
and instead paid Shire a $1.635 billion cancellation fee.94 Shire shares were
down 25% after the announcement.95 Salix Pharmaceuticals Ltd. planned a
$2.7 billion merger with Italian company Cosmos Technologies Ltd., but, after
the regulations, was pressured to cancel the deal with a $25 million
cancellation fee.96 The deal would have allowed Salix to reduce its then
effective tax rate of over 30% to a low 20%.97 As a result of the regulations
and the cancellation of many of these mergers, United States corporations were
subject to multi-million dollar cancellation fees while the foreign corporations
experienced significant drops in share value.98
Despite the cancellation of many pending deals, one merger slipped
through the cracks: the merger between the Florida based Burger King and
Canadian coffee chain Tim Hortons.99 The two fast food chains managed to
close their deal in August.100 Media outlets featured this deal.101 While both
companies claim that they had legitimate business reasons for merging102 and
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Ben Hirschler, AstraZeneca, Shire Dive As U.S. Tax Move Punctures Deal Hopes, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2014, 7:43 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-astrazeneca-shire-dive-asus-tax-move-punctures-deal-hopes-2014-9.
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Brian Solomon, Inversion Implosion: AbbVie-Shire Merger Officially Dead, FORBES
(Oct. 20, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/10/20/inversionimplosion-abbvie-shire-merger-officially-dead/.
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Id.
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Cummins, supra note 12.
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Id.
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Id.
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Clare O’Connor, Burger King and Tim Hortons Make it Official, Merge to Form Third
Largest Fast Food Company, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2014, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
clareoconnor/2014/08/26/burger-king-and-tim-hortons-make-it-official-merge-to-form-thirdlargest-fast-food-company/.
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Id.
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Id.
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Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Explainer: Elizabeth Warren vs. Weiss and the Use of Corporate
Inversions, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/
2014/12/12/explainer-elizabeth-warrens-war-on-wall-street/. There were many other benefits in
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that tax savings were not a primary motivation, the amount of taxes the new
foreign corporation would avoid is staggering. Due to Burger King’s move to
Canada, Americans for Tax Fairness projects the corporation will avoid at least
$400 million, not to mention potentially over $800 million in capital gains
taxes for its shareholders.103
The Burger King and Tim Hortons merger is a prime example of how the
current regulatory code and the new proposed regulations polarize corporations
from the general public. It is largely undisputed that Burger King will likely
avoid paying taxes because the new conglomerate will be headquartered in
Canada. This is hardly newsworthy, as any corporation that has its
headquarters outside of the United States or Japan will lower its tax rate.
Certainly, it is unfair to negatively judge a United States corporation solely on
the basis that it merges with a foreign corporation. There are often legitimate
business reasons beyond taxes that motivate these transactions, as was the case
with Burger King.104 Yet merely because such a corporation will save on taxes
as a result of the transaction, it will face strict public backlash. It is as if a
corporation’s interest to expand internationally and compete with its
counterparts is completely outweighed by a consequential avoidance of taxes.
Even if Burger King or similar corporations do not intend to avoid taxes by
moving their headquarters abroad, because the United States corporate tax rate
is higher than those of nearly every other country and because moving would
potentially save such corporations hundreds of millions of dollars, it is easy to
claim that the corporation intended to avoid taxes. Consequently, media
outlets attack these corporations, the public becomes skeptical, and business is
hindered.
The Treasury Department must consider not only the interest of the
United States, and its tax revenue, but also the interests of the corporations
themselves. There would be no tax revenue to collect from corporations


seeking the merger, including an increase in Burger King’s breakfast sales and an international
expansion of Tim Hortons. Id. This deal would also make the new merged company the third
largest fast food chain, trailing behind McDonalds and KFC. O’Connor, supra note 99. Since
there are apparent business reasons beyond saving taxes that motivated the merger between Burger
King and Tim Hortons, it is debatable whether the IRS regulations had these sorts of transactions in
mind. The IRS and the Treasury Department are not against mergers between multi-national
corporations per se, but rather, the regulations were intended to prevent transactions that were
attempting to avoid section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7874. The specific
provision gives the Treasury Department powers “as are necessary to carry out this section,
including regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of this section as are
necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section.” Id. § 7874(g).
103
Gregory Wallace, Burger King’s Controversial Tax Savings, CNN MONEY (Dec. 11, 2014,
2:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/11/news/burger-king-tax-savings/.
104
See generally O’Connor, supra note 99.
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without United States corporate profits. While the Notice was effective in
preventing inversions, which likely prevented a decrease in tax revenue, if
regulations weigh too heavy against corporations, there may be future
unwanted consequences.105 It is imperative to consider United States corporate
reactions to the regulations because should the regulations push too hard,
corporations may find it beneficial to move their entire operations abroad. As
foreign countries develop more purchasing power and as big business
increasingly crosses boarders, there would be little incentive for U.S.
corporations to keep their operations within the United States. Additionally,
such strict laws hurt the prospect of foreign corporations moving their
operations to the United States, bringing with them jobs and increased tax
revenue.
Prior to the Notice, arguments for reducing the tax rate, structured around
competitiveness of United States corporations in the international market, were
not supported because U.S. corporations managed to reduce their tax rate by
conducting inversions. United States corporations were effectively able to
reduce their own tax rate by not repatriating their foreign earned profits. As a
result, technically, they were not taxed at a higher rate compared to their
foreign counterparts.106 As long as conducting corporate inversions was
possible, domestic corporations could manage to keep their effective tax rate
lower than the statutory tax rate codified in section 11 of the Code. This would
allow them to compete with foreign corporations. New regulations, however,
which would effectively freeze foreign profits until they are subject to United
States taxes, would open the door to arguments that the current regulations
make United States corporations less competitive than foreign corporations.
Notice 2014-52 creates the need for urgent corporate tax reform.107
Regulations would also have implications on social issues and how
individuals view corporations. By law, the board of directors for a corporation
is supposed to make business decisions for the purpose of maximizing share
value and profits. While there are many particular variables to consider in
making a business judgment, peoples’ perception of the corporation is
imperative. If a corporation, which sells its product directly or indirectly to
consumers, has a bad image, its value is at risk. Collectively, as people
become more skeptical of big business and choose to purchase from small
businesses in lower tax brackets, big business profits would decline and United
States tax revenues may follow.
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See generally Ye Hee Lee, supra note 102.
Id.
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See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Notice 2014-52 paints corporations as villains, scheming their way out of
tax liability. The popular press, and even the President of the United States,
condemn corporations for merging with foreign corporations and maximizing
profits—decisions that the law prescribes them to make.108 The current law
treats corporations as entities that must be stopped, rather than pursuing
mutually beneficial ends.
VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Over the past few years, alternative approaches to corporate tax reform
have been proposed to address the high statutory tax rate and other distinctions
between the United States system and those of other countries. An alternative
approach that would repatriate profits, prevent corporate inversions, increase
corporate cooperation, and address the public skepticism of United States
corporations would be to simply reduce the corporate tax rate.109 Creating an
environment conducive to business, particularly in a time of worldwide
development and technological innovation would help propel the United States
ahead of competing countries.110 Merely reducing the rate, however, may not
be sufficient.
A. Reduce the Corporate Tax Rate and Increase the Tax Base
One possible alternative tax reform would be to reduce the tax rate and
increase the tax base to offset the possible loss of revenue.111 To first address
the tax consequences of reducing the corporate rate, it may be possible to
increase corporate tax revenue by lowering the corporate tax rate. Canada is
the prime example. Since 2000, Canada has reduced its corporate tax rate from
43% to 25%.112 Despite the lower rate, Canada’s corporate tax revenue has
steadily increased over the years.113 Compared to the total corporate tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP of the United States, Canada has experienced
greater overall revenue.114
Media outlets generally portrayed Tim Hortons, prior to its recent dealing
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with Burger King, as a demonstration of a corporation’s tendency to move into
lower tax-rate jurisdictions. Tim Hortons, originally a Canadian company, was
acquired by Wendy’s International Inc. in 1995.115 As Canada began to reduce
its corporate tax rate in 2009, Tim Hortons made the move back to Canada.116
At this time, while Canada was experimenting with a plan to slowly cut its
corporate tax rate, its practical effects were not certain.117 By the end of 2010,
however, Canada experienced a surge of attention from businesses worldwide.118 Despite running a sizeable deficit in 2010 of 55.6 billion Canadian
dollars, Canada nonetheless planned to make further cuts in the corporate tax
rate to 15% by 2012, down from the 42.6% corporate tax rate of 2000.119
It is undeniable that Canada experienced an increase in business as a
result of this tax cut.120 KPMG, among the largest service companies in the
world, moved its internal marketing, technology, and service departments to
Canada in 2008, making Toronto KPMG’s biggest support center.121 Spectra
Energy Corp. expressed interest in investing billions of dollars toward
infrastructure projects for natural gas facilities in British Columbia.122 Among
these changes included an influx of financial groups and banks that anticipated
increased business as a result of the changes in Canada.123 Canada
demonstrated that the development of business in the country could
dramatically outweigh the lost tax revenue caused by the reduced corporate tax
rate. Therefore, reducing the corporate tax rate could be an overall beneficial
resolution to the current corporate tax problem that the United States is facing.
As occurred in Canada, while the Federal Government would receive
lower revenue per dollar of profit, the overall increase in taxable profits within
the United States may outweigh the loss due to the increase of businesses
headquartered in the United States. For one, corporations would be less likely
to invert, even when it is a possibility without regulations. Some corporations
would repatriate their profits into the United States and pay the requisite tax,
even if those corporations would retain more money abroad should they not
repatriate. Corporations, after an inversion, still have some difficulty bringing
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profits within the border, where they would be able to reinvest the money in
their headquarters. If the corporate tax rate was lowered, the small cost a
corporation would pay in taxes to repatriate its profits into the United States, in
some instances, would outweigh the benefits of keeping the money abroad and
not paying any additional taxes.
Additionally, corporations would be hesitant in conducting inversions
when the tax rate is lower because scheming out of lower tax liabilities opens
the door to more public backlash. While some of the public may understand
that it would be advantageous for a domestic corporation to be acquired by a
foreign corporation in order to forego the 35% rate, such schemes under a
lower tax rate would be justifiably wrong. The greater the public backlash
against a corporation, the greater the risk of losing profits. From a business
development perspective, the public backlash alone may, in some instances,
deter corporations from inverting despite the existence of immediate financial
incentives. As such corporations disenchant the public, the loss of profits
would outweigh the short financial gains.
Aside from lower tax rates keeping United States corporations within the
Untied States, lower rates could also attract businesses from abroad. This
would not only increase overall revenue, but would also create more jobs and
increase production within the United States. Lastly, by reducing the corporate
tax rate, corporations would become more reluctant to devise plans to avoid
taxes, public backlash of corporations would decline, and societal skepticism
would be relieved.
As a precautionary measure, however, the reforms could also widen the
tax base in order to offset any loss of revenue should the United States not
experience an influx of businesses and increased profits as a result of a lower
corporate tax rate. This was one alternative that Senators Ron Wyden and Dan
Coats proposed as legislation.124 In his blog, supported by Republican Senator
Dan Coats, Senator Wyden claimed, “[t]ax reform can create a simpler, more
business-friendly tax code that increases tax revenue without raising tax rates.
It can lower corporate tax rates to make American businesses more
competitive, which will help businesses to create jobs that pay middle class
wages.”125 This bipartisan effort modeled the proposed legislation after the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, when tax rates were reduced and the tax base
widened to maintain tax revenue.126 Kimberly Clausing presented in her article
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various other proposals from senators, the Obama Administration, and
professionals in the field that in some way, shape, or form reduce the statutory
corporate tax rate to below 30%.127 The primary concern is the trillions of
dollars in deferred profits abroad128 that have not yet been taxed by the United
States.129 As a general point, however, changes to the corporate tax rate and to
the tax base are a widely accepted necessity.
B. Changes to the Non-Territorial System
Another alternative, which Great Britain and Japan recently adopted, and
a method which is utilized by the majority of developed countries, would be a
territorial tax system. Under a strictly territorial system, the United States
would not tax profits made outside of its borders.130 While adopting such a
system would greatly favor corporations and would completely solve the
problems of repatriation, it would be unduly detrimental to United States tax
revenues.131 Under this system, the United States would collect less revenue
than it already does because not only would it not tax foreign profits from
inverted corporations, but foreign profits of domestic corporations would also
not be subject to tax.132 However, there are variations of the territorial system
that would subject some foreign income to United States taxes.133 For
example, in Japan, if foreign profits arise in a country with a corporate tax rate
below 20%, Japan administers a tax that is higher than the rate it applies to
profits made domestically.134 Other countries adopt a system that compares its
rate to those of the country in which foreign profits arise.135 If that foreign
country’s rate is significantly lower than the domestic country’s rate, then an
alternative rate is applied.136 Under either Japan’s system or that of other
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countries, repatriation is not necessary to apply the tax.137 Therefore,
transactions such as inversions or hopscotch loans would not help corporations
avoid their tax obligations.138 Should the United States adopt a territorial
system, and apply taxes immediately on foreign profits in countries with tax
rates below a certain threshold at a fairly higher rate, such an alternative would
be favorable to corporations, without creating an incentive to keep profits
abroad, or intentionally do business in low tax countries in order to merely
avoid taxes. Alternatively, United States tax revenue would not be greatly
affected when corporations do business in low tax rate countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of the economic downturn in 2008, increased public costs in
healthcare, and the growing budget deficit, the United States recognizes its tax
revenue is not sufficient to cover its costs. Simultaneously, as the United
States maintains such a high corporate tax rate in order to cover these costs,
multinational corporations utilize loopholes, preventing trillions of dollars in
profits from being taxed by the United States. As is expected given these
circumstances, both public officials and everyday citizens condemn these
corporations for being unpatriotic and legally avoiding their tax obligations. It
is this predicament that makes tax reform a priority for corporations,
professionals in the field, Congress, and the President of the United States. It
is widely accepted that the United States corporate tax system is broken. It is
unnecessarily complex, difficult to enforce, out of tune with its foreign
counterparts, and an undue burden to corporations and their practices. The
Notice released in September 2014 does not help. The proposed regulations
further complicate the already complicated code and put United States
corporations at a disadvantage by effectively shutting every door they may use
to compete against foreign corporations from nearly every other developed
country.
A better alternative to these regulations would not be to focus on the
minor provisions in the code that allow corporations to invert and lend
hopscotch loans, but rather to attack the problem at its root. A root made up of
a combination of the exorbitantly high corporate tax rate unchanged since the
1980s, the non-territorial system that creates a disincentive for corporations to
repatriate their profits, and the tax base, which could be widened in order to
maintain the requisite revenue. Once these core issues are remedied, the need
for further regulations will become known. Closing the current loopholes is
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merely a wasted effort that may be completely unnecessary should fixing the
core issues solve the problem on their own. The government cannot demand
patriotism; it is the individual’s choice to be patriotic. If the current state of
affairs puts corporations at a disadvantage, we cannot blame them for being
unpatriotic when they find legal means to save money. The problem may just
be from within.





